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ABSTRACT  
The aboriginal political discourse regarding self-determination would be more useful to communities if it incorporated an understanding
of the individual as relational, autonomous, and self-determ ining. That is, a developed perspective of individual self-determ ination is
necessary to move collective self-determination beyond rhetoric to a meaningful and practical political project that engages aboriginal
peoples and is deliberately inclusive of aboriginal women.
RÉSUM É
Les discours politique autochtone au sujet de l'auto-détermination serait beaucoup plus utile aux collectivités s'il incorporait une
compréhension de la personne en tant que relationnelle autonome et auto-déterminante. C'est-à-dire, créer une perspective de l'auto-
détermination individuelle de la personne est nécessaire pour faire avancer l'auto-détermination collective au-delà de la rhétorique vers
un project significatif de politique qui engage les peuples autochtones et qui inclus de façon délibérée les femmes autochtones.
INTRODUCTION
Indigenous peoples have the right of self-
determination. By virtue of that right they
freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and
cultural development. 
(Draft UN Declaration 1994) 
Self-determination is a broad political
principle with application to both individuals and
groups. As a collective principle, self-determination
is usually articulated politically or legally according
to international law and various political ideologies.
As an individual principle, self-determination is
articulated best in terms of agency, conceptions of
autonomy, and relationships (Nedelsky 1989;
1990). I propose to explore these two perspectives
on self-determination from an aboriginal
community standpoint. The aboriginal political
discourse regarding self-determination would be
more useful to communities if it were to incorporate
a practical and developed understanding of
individual self-determination. In other words, an
individual perspective on self-determination could
perhaps shift collective self-determination beyond
rhetoric to a meaningful and effective political
project that engages aboriginal peoples and is truly
inclusive of aboriginal women.
Self-determination is an immense and
complex concept. The challenge before me is to
carve a "slice" of self-determination from the
discourse that is small enough to fit the confines of
this paper but still contains enough substance to
maintain its coherence as a subject. First, I will
outline the generally more abstract political and
legal conceptions of collective aboriginal self-
determination. Second, I will outline Jennifer
Nedelsky's feminist legal theory of individual self-
determination and relational autonomy. Third, I will
discuss several self-determination issues that arise
from the experiences and present circumstances of
Saulteau First Nation, a Cree, Saulteaux, and
Dunneza community (and my own) in northeast
British Columbia. Fourth, I will consider how both
the collective and individual approaches to self-
determination may be applied to on-the-ground
community development strategies for Saulteau
First Nation.
ABORIGINAL SELF-DETERMINATION
[S]elf-determination is identified as a
universe of human rights precepts
concerned broadly with peoples, including
indigenous peoples, and grounded in the
idea that all are equally entitled to control
their own destinies. Self-determination
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gives rise to remedies that tear at the
legacies of empire, discrimination,
suppression of democratic participation,
and cultural suffocation. 
(Anaya 1996, 75)
This section describes the broad contours
of indigenous self-determination as it has developed
in the international political and legal discourse.1
According to James Anaya, self-determination is a
principle of the highest order within the
international system, but its meaning and
application remain bitterly contested by nation
states and indigenous peoples (75). Cree activist
Ted Moses argues that self-determination is not just
a political or an economic right, but rather
encompasses all aspects of human development and
interaction - cultural, social, political, and economic
(Muehlebach 2003, 253). Further, it is "a complex
of closely woven and inextricably related rights
which are interdependent, where no one aspect is
paramount over any other. It is a right that forms the
basis of all other rights" (253). Similarly, according
to the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples
(the Royal Commission), self-determination entitles
indigenous peoples to negotiate their status and
form of representation with existing states (Canada
1996, 172).
Historically, the term "self-determination"
was associated with "Western liberal democratic
ideals and the aspirations of European nationalists"
and formed an important part of the international
political discourse around the time of World War I
(Anaya 1996, 76). However, early use of "self-
determination" was not limited to advancing
western capitalism. In the context of socialist
struggle, Lenin and Stalin also used the term "self-
determination" to further the goal of class liberation
(McDonald 2001, 4). With the creation of the
United Nations (UN) following World War II, "the
self-determination of peoples" was included in the
founding principles of the Charter of the United
Nations (Anaya 1996, 76).
Early international law concerned itself
primarily with the sovereignty of the then-emerging
nation states, but recent human rights activism has
expanded the application of self-determination to
individuals and groups of people. This more recent
and presumptively universal principle of self-
determination applies to all governments for the
benefit all human beings living under those
governments (Anaya 1996, 76). As a significant
international principle, self-determination justified
the division of Germany and the Austro-Hungarian
and Ottoman empires, and guided the ensuing
remapping of Europe (Anaya 1996, 76). Since then,
the meaning of self-determination has continued to
evolve significantly, and there is a very broad range
of self-determination claims as well as claimants
(Muehlebach 2003, 243).
Nation states resist indigenous peoples'
claims to self-determination by raising fears about
the potential loss of territorial integrity, internal
political instability, violent chaos, and secession.
There are many criticisms of self-determination,
including those that claim it creates reactionary,
essentialist, and segregationist politics (Muehlebach
2003, 245). According to Anaya, this fear is rooted
in a narrow conception of self-determination which
is shaped by extremist political posturing and ethnic
chauvinism (1996, 75). Alternatively, self-
determination can be understood as enhancing
interconnectedness between diverse cultures, and
" increasing linkages, commonalities , and
interdependencies among people, economies, and
the spheres of power" (1996, 79). The Royal
Commission noted that self-determination does not
normally include the right of secession (Canada
1996, 172). In other words, the right to self-
determination and the right to secession are distinct
and should not be conflated in the indigenous
international discourse.
Self-determination is concerned with
peoples. Since the terms "self-determination" and
"peoples" are not defined in international law, the
current debate is about what "peoples" means
(Anaya 1996, 79). Does it mean only those peoples
organized in an independent statehood, or does it
also apply to indigenous peoples in various cultural
configurations? Within this controversy, three
problematic approaches narrow the conception of
peoples to (i) those in a colonial territory under
foreign domination, (ii) the whole of the population
of an independent state or colonial territory, or (iii)
cohesive ethnographic groups with historic
territorial sovereignty (Anaya 1996, 77-78). All of
these conceptions are premised on a division of the
globe into mutually exclusive sovereign territories
that denies recognition of self-determination to
substate groups that are not state centred (Anaya
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1996, 78). Unfortunately, in their resistance, the
nation states assume that the "self" in self-
determination is limited to a sovereign state
containing bounded peoples. Consequently, the
ongoing UN debates focus on two questions: (i) To
whom should self-determination be granted? (ii)
What should self-determination entail (Muehlebach
2003, 247)?2
Anaya argues that in the context of self-
determination, the term "peoples" must encompass
the broad range of "associational and cultural
patterns actually found in the human experience"
(78). In the same vein, Muehlebach suggests that
the evolving definitions of self-determination reflect
how indigenous peoples understand themselves as
marginalized and culturally distinct rights-bearing
groups under international law (246). In other
words, it is the self that is at stake in the self-
determination debate. According to Anaya:
"Properly understood, the principle of self-
determination, commensurate with the values it
incorporates, benefits groups - that is, 'peoples' in
the ordinary sense of the term - throughout the
spectrum of humanity's complex web of
interrelationships and loyalties, and not just peoples
defined by existing or perceived sovereign
boundaries" (79).
In Canada, the Royal Commission
recognized self-determination as a right held by all
aboriginal peoples, including Métis and Inuit
(Canada 1996, 172). While the Royal Commission
is careful to point out that an aboriginal nation
cannot be identified in a mechanistic manner
according to objective criteria, it did recommend
that self-determination should be vested in nations,
not in small communities such as Indian bands
created by the Indian Act.  According to the Royal3
Commission, an aboriginal nation is a "sizeable
body of Aboriginal people with a shared sense of
national identity that constitutes the predominant
population in a certain territory or collection of
territories" (1996, 178).  This definition comprises4
three elements: a collective sense of identity, an
adequate population size to ensure group capacity,
and a geographic base (178-179).
According to James Tully, while the goal
of self-determination continues to drive the
decolonization struggles internationally, including
those in Canada, the United States, Australia, and
New Zealand, support from the UN is minimal
(2003, 294). Despite glimmers of hope such as
those afforded by the International Court of Justice
Western Sahara decision,  various UN working5
groups and draft declarations, indigenous peoples
are still not recognized as colonized peoples for the
purposes of self-determination (294). Basically,
international law, the UN, and its committees
remain the creations of the nation states, and oppose
any threat to their exclusive jurisdiction.  Most6
importantly, Tully adds a critical perspective to how
colonial imperialism has been able to successfully
refashion its outward appearance so as to seem non-
imperial, and to pervade indigenous political
projects with concepts of self-determination that are
modeled on the basic structure and behaviours of
colonial imperialism (Tully 2004). In other words,
indigenous peoples have adopted a form of self-
determination that closely resembles the earlier
model of colonial imperialism - arguably with the
consequence of undermining the overall indigenous
political struggle.
Tully's thesis is that European colonialism
deliberately developed into a "post-colonial global
competitive system of formally independent and
equal, capitalist and constitutional, states bound
together by international law" (2004, 4). Basically,
this was a process of colonialism growing up and
engaging in more sophisticated forms of imperial
expansion wars in combination with the imposition
of western legal regimes, the introduction of
commercial competition, and the general
westernization of non-westernized states. This post-
colonial transformation is currently described and
advanced in the language of self-determination and
popular sovereignty. For example, Woodrow
Wilson promoted freedom and openness to free
trade under the dominance of the United States as a
universal goal in the competition with European
empires. To this end, Wilson declared that "every
people should be left free to determine its own
polity, its own development, unhindered,
unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the
great and powerful" (Tully 2004, 25). 
In these new and superior global
circumstances, colonies could overthrow colonial
rule and achieve liberation "based on the consent
and popular sovereignty of the people, and thus
[move] into a world system of similar nation states"
(Tully 2004, 5). In the tradition of popular
sovereignty, although former European colonies
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could liberate themselves from colonial rule, they
remained imprinted with the basic imperial
institutions and relationships from the colonial
period (Tully 2004, 17). Colonies adopted the
language of self-determination, but achieved only
formal equality while being substantially unequal
(Tully 2004, 23-24). According to Tully this path to
self-determination is a dead end: 
This whole way of thinking, then, of
freed o m  as  liberat ion  from  a l l
rela tionships o f dependency: the
independent self-determination of some
subject (individual, people, nation,
civilization, or, more recently, the
multitude) is itself a European script that
has been self-contradictory and dangerous
from the beginning.      (Tully 2004, 43)
Within this global picture is the internal
colonization of indigenous peoples who have never
stopped resisting, but who have also adopted the
same language of self-determination. Basically, the
world  power structure is not explicitly
acknowledged and indigenous peoples are
represented as free agents within it, but such
freedom is imagined only in relation to global
imperialism (Tully 2004, 44). Obviously, this vision
of freedom is too narrow and indigenous peoples
must move far beyond the conceptual constraints of
colonial imperialism.
INDIVIDUAL SELF-DETERMINATION
In this section, I outline the "on-the-
ground" individual dimension of self-determination.
Jennifer Nedelsky argues that a new conception of
autonomy is required in feminist legal theory (1989,
1). According to her, the western liberal conception
of autonomy is limited to the idea of atomistic, self-
determining individuals who form the basic units in
political and legal theory.  Since the value of7
individual autonomy is critical to feminism, the
challenge is to develop an autonomy theory without
the usual liberal ideological baggage. Nedelsky
advocates the development of an understanding of
autonomy that recognizes the inherently social
nature of human beings (1989, 1). Given this goal,
how does the constitutiveness of social relations
combine with the value of individual self-
determination (1989, 2)?
Essential to the liberal autonomous
individual is the freedom to be self-determining and
self-making, and no one is willing to abandon the
powerful idea of people making their own lives
(Nedelsky 1989, 2). Indeed, this is one of the tenets
of feminism - that women define themselves rather
than solely being defined by their relations with
others (1989, 2). According to Nedelsky, in order to
become autonomous, people must develop and
sustain the capacity to find their own internal law,
and the work is to figure out what social
relationships and personal practices foster this
capability:
The necessary social dimension of the
vision I am sketching comes from the
insistence, first, that the capacity to find
one's own law can develop only in the
context of relations with others (both
intimate and more broadly social) that
nurture this capacity, and second, that the
"content"  o f one 's own law is
comprehensible only with reference to
shared social norms, values, and concepts.
            (1989, 3)
Nedelsky's new conception of autonomy is
that it does not derive from isolation since people
do not live in isolation. Rather, the manifestation of
a person's self-determining autonomy is through
relationships with others (1989, 4). Individual, self-
determining autonomy is not threatened by the
collectivity, but is constitutive of it. Therefore,
reconceived autonomy has a social component built
into it. 
There is an erroneous but prevailing belief
in a dichotomy between individual independence
and security from collective power: "[T]he choice is
posed between admitting collective control and
preserving autonomy in any given realm" (Nedelsky
1989, 6). While there is a tension between the
individual and the collective, this dichotomy
constrains the range of possibilities for various
social arrangements, and the result is an unfortunate
"poverty of imagination" (Nedelsky 1989, 7 & 11).
Indeed, the imposition of such a false dichotomy
has been a formative factor in the experiences of
aboriginal women. In other words, in colonial
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aboriginal communities, rights characterized as
collective (usually those rights held by males) have
been held to override rights characterized as
individual (usually those rights claimed by females)
- to the detriment of aboriginal women collectively.
To add to this regrettable state, much of
the literature that examines aboriginal membership
issues appears to accept the exclusive Indian Act
membership model or the more recent derivative
band membership codes as representative of
aboriginal cultural practices. These authors seem to
fail to understand that the exclusive membership
model is a colonial creation that has been
internalized by aboriginal groups at the cost of
displacing their own models of citizenship. Instead,
academics develop arguments around the exclusive
membership model and pose questions as to
whether aboriginal people should have the right to
adhere to such discriminatory membership practices
on the basis of difference (Eisenberg 2003;
Macklem 2001).
Nedelsky argues that the community is
both a source of individual autonomy and a danger
to it. Given this, the new forms of autonomy within
a collectivity will involve choices and trade-offs.
But she also predicts that individual autonomy in a
collective model will be different from the
individualistic, oppositional model of the liberal,
capitalist state (1989, 12).
Turning to the actual individual experience
and feeling of being relationally autonomous and
self-determining, Nedelsky writes that "the
underlying concern...[is] the actual experience of
autonomy. We cannot attend to what gives citizens
a sense of autonomy, to what makes them feel
competent, effective, able to exercise some control
over their lives, as opposed to feeling passive,
helpless, and dependent" (1989, 14). Self-
determining autonomy, then, is a capacity that
exists in the context of our social relations and only
in conjunction with the internal sense of being
autonomous - and this sense of being autonomous
is felt (14).
SAULTEAU FIRST NATION
[T]he struggle over indigenous self-
determination will ultimately be fought out
on the ground. (Muehlebach 2003, 249)
According to the Royal Commission, three
types of disputes can arise when an aboriginal
group identifies itself as self-determining - identity
of the group, representation of the group, and
membership in the group (Canada 1996, 183). This
next section explores several of the local leadership
and membership policies that raise these self-
determination disputes - and while gender has not
been identified explicitly in the disputes, it is
certainly an implicit factor. I begin by providing a
brief background for Treaty 8 and Saulteau First
Nation.
Treaty 8
Beneath the surface of jurisprudence
addressing the form and substance of
treaty rights are deeper questions about the
normative significance of the treaty
process. Aboriginal people are alone
among Canadian citizens in having
entered into treaties with the Crown;
participation in the treaty process thus
constitutes one aspect of indigenous
d i f fe re nc e ,  a n  a sp ec t  tha t has
constitutional significance. 
(Macklem 2001, 136)
Treaty 8 covers a vast area of land
including northern Alberta, the southwest part of the
Northwest Territories, and the northeast corner of
British Columbia (BC) that is east of the Rocky
Mountains (Treaty 8). As with the other treaties in
Canada, the negotiations for Treaty 8 were
precipitated by colonial expansion - in this case, the
Klondike gold rush and the advent of non-
aboriginal settlers (Madill 1986). The federal
government conducted the treaty negotiations with
Cree, Dunneza, and Chipewyan peoples.
Northeast BC is the homeland of the
Dunneza. According to the oral histories of
Saulteaux elders, their spiritual leader ,
Kahkakokwanis, saw a vision of the "Two
Mountains that Sit Together," now called the Twin
Sister Mountains. So Kahkakokwanis guided a
group of Saulteaux on a ten-year search across
Canada until, in 1911, they found these mountains
in northeast BC at the eastern end of Moberly Lake
(Napoleon 1998, 28-29). According to Saulteaux
elder Fred Courtoreille, the Saulteaux lived at
Moberly Lake for three years before they were
36 Napoleon
persuaded to enter into Treaty 8 - or according to
Madill, were "admitted" without the negotiated
adhesion process (Madill 1986; Napoleon 1998,
32). In 1918, this area was set out as a 7,646-acre
reserve, now Saulteau First Nation (Indian and
Northern Affairs Canada, 2).
SAULTEAU FIRST NATION:
BACKGROUND AND POLICIES
Saulteau First Nation has approximately
644 members, but fewer than half of them currently
reside on the reserve (Napoleon v. Garbitt 1977,
paras. 4-5). While there are a few small businesses
located on the reserve, most band revenues are
generated through a number of agreements
negotiated with oil and gas, forestry, and other
corporations that are in the business of extracting
resources from Treaty 8 lands.  The area8
surrounding Saulteau First Nations is rural, but
includes a number of mid-sized towns.
The other bands in the BC Treaty 8
Association are Doig, Halfway, Blueberry, Fort
Nelson, and Tsaa Tse K'nai (Prophet River). These
five communities are predominantly Dunneza and
are located in more isolated areas much further
north. In 2000, the Tse'Khene First Nation (McLeod
Lake Band), a community of Sekani people located
south of Saulteau First Nation, negotiated a modern-
day adhesion to Treaty 8.9
With the goal of maintaining Saulteaux
cultural practices, Saulteau First Nation has
structured its election policy around its original five
founding Saulteaux families. In 1988, Saulteau First
Nation passed a band bylaw pursuant to s. 2(3)(a) of
the Indian Act which recognizes the inherent power
of a band to establish custom election procedures
rather than follow the procedures provided for in s.
74 of the Indian Act (Napoleon v. Garbitt, paras. 7-
9). Basically, the Saulteau First Nation system of
custom elections was codified into the Saulteau
Indian Band Government Law containing
procedures for each of the five founding families to
nominate and elect a "headman" (who could be
male or female) to serve as a band councillor for the
band. In turn, voters from the entire band then elect
one of the five headmen as chief (Saulteau Indian
Band Government Law 1996). In practice however,
all the chiefs have been male and the majority of
headmen selected have been male, but to date this
has not been challenged. It is important to note that
the women of the founding families participate
actively in the selection of the headmen.
For the past two years, the band has been
discussing amendments of the original Saulteau
Indian Band Government Law.  There has been10
considerable disagreement within Saulteau First
Nation about its election procedures, including
several acrimonious legal actions (Napoleon v.
Garbitt; Saulteau Indian Band v. Totusek). To11 
date, these disputes have been largely procedural
rather than substantial. That is, the disputes have
not directly challenged the founding family
structure, but rather have focussed on the legitimacy
and interpretation of the amendments to the
Saulteau Indian Band Government Law, candidate
eligibility requirements, and accountability of the
headmen and chief. Nonetheless, I think the
procedural disputes are directly connected to the
same overall issues raised by the founding family
structure. The band council structure is founded on
assumptions regarding western style leadership,
representational democracy, and accountability.
Even when filled with family headmen, it is
primarily intended to meet the external bureaucratic
and legal demands of the federal government as
opposed to the need for a local political project. 
While I understand that cultural change is
necessary to respond to challenging contemporary
issues, I think that there are larger questions about
the distortion and reification of cultural institutions
in the Saulteau First Nation Band Government Law
which require serious study, but are far beyond the
scope of this paper.
In 1986, Saulteau First Nation passed the
Saulteau Indian Nation Citizenship Act (approved
by the minister) pursuant to s. 10 of the Indian Act,
which was amended in 1985 to allow local
membership codes. This bylaw enables the band to
determine who is a member, rather than rely on the
procedures provided for in s. 6 of the Indian Act.
(While the bylaw uses the term "citizen" in place of
"band member," the document still describes a band
member, not a citizen.)
According to the Saulteau Indian Nation
Citizenship Act, the people qualified to be band
members are those who were entitled prior to the
April 1985 Indian Act amendment, or were born
after April 1985 to parents who are both members
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of Saulteau First Nation. Persons may apply for
membership if they (i) have one birth parent who is
a member of Saulteau First Nation, or (ii) are under
19 years and are adopted by a Saulteau First Nation
member. In reality, the 1985 Indian Act amendment
failed to substantively rectify the discrimination
against aboriginal women, and instead, the
discrimination is delayed and borne by their
grandchildren (Napoleon 2001). 
Given this, the current membership list for
Saulteau First Nation, and other bands, is arguably
still founded on past discrimination, but this has not
yet been interrogated. The first step is to determine
whether the applicant is a descendant of a Saulteau
First Nation member. If the applicant is an adult, the
enrolment officer shall consider whether the
applicant:
1) can speak Saulteaux or Cree;
2) is knowledgeable about Saulteau First
Nation customs and traditions; and 
3) agrees to a five-year probation period
during which time he or she will acquire
knowledge about the community's way of
life.
Additionally, in the case of adult or non-
adult applicants, the enrolment officer may consider
how long the applicant has lived with Saulteau First
Nation, and the social and cultural ties that the
applicant has with Saulteau First Nation.12
(Interestingly, the membership criteria do not
actually deal with the establishment of descent.
There are a number of obvious technical problems
in the Saulteau Indian Nation Citizenship Act
criteria, but these are not the focus of this paper.)13
SELF-DETERM INATION ISSUES
Saulteau First Nation is attempting to use
its leadership and membership practices to protect
itself in a colonizing world by determining the
authenticity of its members. It would be easy to
characterize and dismiss their efforts as essentialist,
but the community's experience and perspective
have merit and deserve serious consideration. The
ultimate goal of Saulteau First Nation is profoundly
important, but I contend that trying to accomplish
this goal with the founding-family election policy
and exclusive-descent membership standard is
fundamentally flawed.
Size of Community
Looking at Saulteau First Nation's history
and present circumstances brings to light a number
of critical self-determination issues. The first has to
do with size and scale of community. Saulteau First
Nation is a tiny community not unlike many of the
other six hundred Indian bands in Canada. Although
its population includes Cree and Dunneza, it is the
only predominantly Saulteaux community in
northern British Columbia.
Cole Harris has described how the colonial
government purposely set out small reserves in BC
to avoid having to deal with large congregations of
aboriginal people. Harris writes (2002, 102), "Large
reserves, moreover, would enable Indians to
'combine against whites'...[and] 'the safety of the
settlers in BC lies in the disunion among the
tribes.'" According to the 1876-78 Joint Indian
Reserve Commission (Sproat 1877, 121),"[t]he
efforts of the Indians to combine and the hope of
safety presented by our efforts to separate the tribes
is a practical commentary upon that argument."
Another rationale for the fragmentary reserve
allocation was to ensure that aboriginal labour was
widely distributed and available to colonial
undertakings (1877, 101& 265).
This early colonial tactic still informs and
shapes the aboriginal political landscape in BC
today. For example, the BC Treaty Commission is
negotiating treaties with aboriginal groups that vary
in size from 136 to 7,517, with a median size of 800
(Chartrand 1996). This means that larger aboriginal
nations  were (and are) effectively fractured into14
smaller political and administrative units for the
purposes of the Indian Act, and while many are
negotiating collectively as nations, others are
negotiating separately as bands. For example, in
northwestern BC, the Tsimshian nation is divided
into seven bands and the Gitksan nation is divided
into six bands. The elected band structures and
reserves cut across both the Tsimshian and Gitksan
legal orders and political structures.  15
Given issues of scale and the complex
demands of self-government, it is extremely
difficult for such small groups of people to
effectively negotiate and implement treaty
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agreements. In fact, Chartrand argues that it is
simply impossible for such small communities to
negotiate or implement substantive self-government
measures.
Citizenship
Another self-determination issue is how
the people of Saulteau First Nation are defining
themselves. While it is important to locate this issue
within the larger political and historical context, it
is critical not to lose sight of how colonialism was
imposed in gendered forms with aboriginal women
bearing the primary consequences. Historically,
aboriginal people have been forced to defend
themselves against relentless land theft and
marginalization by a colonial regime. Now,
aboriginal people are engaged in ongoing struggles
to reclaim land and resources, self-government,
identity, and language and culture. These struggles
have resulted in many aboriginal people relying on
colonially imposed, gendered (at least explicitly so
until 1985), and exclusive definitions of
"aboriginal" to defensively draw around themselves
boundaries such as blood quantum and Indian Act
membership formulas. I think the metaphorical
boundaries of blood and descent may be usefully
likened to Nedelsky's metaphor of boundaries as an
attempt to comprehend and protect the basic values
of freedom and autonomy (1990, 1).
I contend that pre-contact aboriginal
societies practised forms of nationhood that were
deliberately inclusive in order to build strong
nations with extensive international ties (Napoleon
2001, 113). From a pragmatic perspective, had
aboriginal peoples practised the exclusive and sexist
forms of membership that are in place today via the
Indian Act, they would not have survived and North
America would have been truly terra nullius.  One16
of my arguments is that the membership conflict
could be eliminated by properly contextualizing it
within an understanding of aboriginal citizenship
and nationhood, and applying the goals contained in
aboriginal legal orders. I am speaking very
generally here because obviously there is no one
aboriginal society. Each aboriginal nation will have
to conduct its own analysis of these concepts
according to its culture, history, and present
circumstances. 
Today's membership issues derive from
colonial history and the relationship between
aboriginal peoples and the Canadian state. The legal
and political establishment of the Canadian state
included the division of powers according to the
Constitution Act of 1867. Under this arrangement,
Indians and Indian lands were classified as a federal
responsibility in s. 91(24). The federal state
administers revenues to the bands, which distribute
these funds locally to those who qualify as
members.
With the establishment of bands under the
Indian Act, aboriginal conceptions of inclusive
citizenship also devolved into constructs of
exclusive, usually gendered , membership
practices.  Over the years, membership has been1 7
further conflated and interpreted to mean ethnicity,
blood quantum, and descent (Alfred 1999, 85). I
think this can be likened to the "clientalization" of
citizens, which has been rightly criticized for
making them dependent and passive (Borrows
1998, 142). In and of itself, membership for the
purpose of receiving benefits does not build a
nation. The membership model is simply incapable
of developing or encouraging the kind of reciprocal
relationships necessary for strong social and
political cohesion.
There is extensive literature about First
Nations communities' membership practices and
also extensive case law in both Canada and the
United States where aboriginal peoples have turned
to the courts to sort out band membership disputes
(Imai 1996, 21-30). According to Carole Goldberg,
the most "paralysing conflicts" in the American
Indian constitutional reform efforts were about the
criteria for membership (2002, 437). As with
Nedelsky's boundary metaphor, the membership-as-
boundary for aboriginal communities is destructive
and fails to address the real problems of relational
autonomy (1990, 1).
Michael Ignatieff argues that the inclusive
civic nationalism model enables a nation to
comprise a diverse citizenry because ideology, law,
and a shared set of political practices and values
hold it together (1994, 3). In contrast, in a nation
held together by exclusive nationalism comprising
ethnicity and (the abstraction of) "blood," unity is
based on pre-existing ethnic characteristics, not
shared rights. In the essentialist ethnic nation, an
individual's characteristics are inherited rather than
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chosen (7-8). Ignatieff goes on to argue that ethnic
nationalism cannot create social cohesion or
community, and when it fails to create unity,
ethnically nationalistic regimes turn to force (8).
Nedelsky suggests that the institutions,
social practices, and relations that foster the feeling
of autonomy may vary considerably across cultures
and over time within a culture (1989, 14). Given the
predominance of the western construct of citizen
and citizenship, the first challenge for aboriginal
groups is to develop their own constructs that are
drawn from their own cultures and histories. I have
argued elsewhere (2002, 149) that, in decentralized
societies such as many in BC, the main rights-
enforcing relationship is not between the individual
and the state. Rather, the rights (and
responsibilities) of individuals are enforced
collectively through the relationships in the social
structure. I am not advocating a return to some
mythical golden past, but I do think that cultural
principles and values should be articulated and
critically examined for possible application to the
problems and demands of today's world,
governance and justice being only two examples. 
According to John Borrows, citizenship is
more than the existence of rights (2003, 227). He
advances an interesting argument for expanding
aboriginal citizenship to comprise three facets:
some type of formal relationship among citizens
and groups within the state; the freedom to act with
others in any variety of groups not created by the
state; and respectful acknowledgement of their self-
identity, even without state sanction (2003, 227 &
229). In addition, Borrows argues that "citizenship
must also concern itself with social cohesion, which
includes concerns about social stability, political
unity, and civil peace." This expands citizenship
from an individual level to a collective, political
level that is concerned with society as a whole
(2003, 229-230).
Saulteau First Nation and other aboriginal
groups face the same challenge that is before
Canada, namely, to "develop intercultural norms
that allow for deep diversity, while at the same time
creating societies that have certain shared horizons
and civic engagement" (Borrows 2003, 249).
Another major challenge before aboriginal
communities and the rest of Canada is to develop a
theory of citizenship that moves beyond the
dysfunctional, passive, rights-based model to an
"activity-based citizenship [that] requires some kind
of social space that permits people to freely come
together for their own purposes and to pursue goals
that may not be officially pursued by the state"
(Borrows 2002, 142).
I do not think Saulteau First Nation's
current membership and leadership policies
facilitate a larger conception of citizenship that
allows for diversity and the assumption of collective
political responsibility for society as a whole. Nor
do I think that room or support is created for women
to overcome the colonial legacy of double
oppression. But I do think that the principles
contained in Saulteaux, Cree, and Dunneza
conceptions of citizenship can be articulated to form
the basis for the development of an activity-based
citizenry. 
LOCAL APPLICATION OF THE 
SELF-DETERM INATION PRINCIPLES
Christoph Möllers writes that while
modernity has raised doubts about the justification
of government, it has actually increased its scope.
Consequently, "[c]ommon goods like peace,
welfare, efficiency or social equality are either too
abstract or too contested to produce legitimacy for
public action" (11). Rather than defining common
goods further, modern political theory has focussed
on the ideas of individual and political freedom,
autonomy or self-determination. In turn, standards
for government justification stem from the self-
determination of individuals and collectives rather
than from any social change involving the common
or public good.
I think Möllers' insight offers an important
caution to aboriginal people about the importance of
grounding theory in a political project. Failure to do
so may result in theory being reduced to an abstract
distraction that obscures the more difficult
challenges of the day, or worse, is simply reduced
to rhetoric.
Collective Self-Determination
According to the criteria set out by the
Royal Commission, Saulteau First Nation does not
qualify as a nation capable of self-determination
because its population is too small and it does not
comprise the predominant population of a territory
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or geographic base. Arguably however, Saulteau
First Nation can engage in a larger self-
determination project with the Dunneza in Treaty 8
lands. Since the Dunneza are part of the much
larger Dene nation, with territories spanning
provincial and territorial borders into the Northwest
Territories and Alberta, practical and strategic
political consideration must be given to this larger
affiliation. June McCue, a member of the Ned'u'ten
people, has argued that international self-
determination principles may form the foundation
for a smaller aboriginal group's proposed peace
treaty negotiations with the federal government
(McCue 1998). Located along Babine Lake, the
Ned'u'ten number about 1,300 persons. McCue
rejects the BC Treaty Commission process as a
conquest treaty model (196). Instead, she applies
Anaya's substantive/remedial self-determination
framework to the Ned'u'ten:18
Anaya has articulated that the theoretical
scope and content of the right to self-
determination must be expanded to include
peoples outside the decolonization regime
context. At the same time he argues that
self-determination for indigenous peoples
means the abandonment of existing
conceptions of sovereignty, statehood and
decolonization processes. He posits that
these concepts are out of date given a
world where state boundaries mean less
and less and are by no means coextensive
with all relevant spheres of community.  
       (184)
In this framework, decolonization
processes form the remedial arm of self-
determination. The other arm is formed by the
substantive self-determination processes, whereby
legitimate aboriginal governmental entities are
subjected to human rights standards extending from
the core values of freedom and equality (McCue
1998, 185). In Canada, it is usually aboriginal
women who have been on the frontlines of human
rights struggles demanding the application of
human rights standards. For aboriginal women, the
basic issues continue to be safety and protection
from violence, social benefits and housing, and
participation in governance and economic
development. Consequently, many aboriginal
women take the position that the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms must apply to Indian bands
and all other aboriginal governance initiatives
(Nahanee 1993).
In the Ned'u'ten case, the constitutive
aspect of substantive self-determination would be
the political ordering of the bah'lats (clan governing
structure). The bah'lats would be continued and
adapted to meet the contemporary needs of the
Ned'u'ten (McCue 1998, 185). Turning to the
remedial arm of self-determination, McCue writes
that recognition of Ned'u'ten territorial boundaries
would be restored, but that it remains to be seen just
how denial of self-determination could be remedied
outside the UN colonial context (1998, 187).
Nonetheless, McCue argues that a conceptualization
of self-determination that contains substantive and
remedial aspects, "can be seen as a creative and
imaginative way to maneuver around the existing
obstacles of state practice that has not historically,
since the UN came into existence, extended the
right to self-determination to peoples that are
indigenous and colonized in their homelands" (189).
McCue proposes that the political
relationship between the Ned'u'ten and Canada is an
international one, and requires that the Ned'u'ten's
status be legally and politically equal to Canada's.
The building of the future relationship between the
Ned'u'ten and Canada would be predicated on the
recognition of the Ned'u'ten's bah'lats as self-
determining (1998, 189). McCue does not address
the issue of the small Ned'ut'en population or the
nation criteria posed by the Royal Commission.
Nonetheless, she does outline a comprehensive
Ned'u'ten-Canada treaty process according to
Ned'u'ten law.
McCue's thesis introduces an interesting
approach to Saulteau First Nation's consideration of
collective self-determination possibilities. Basically,
the  p roce ss o f  wo rk ing  o u t  wh a t  a
substantive/remedial framework would look like for
Saulteau First Nation is an important step in
political development. At the very least, this could
involve imagining and thinking through questions
about forms of governance, relationships with the
Dunneza and Canada, and gender and human rights
conflicts. Given Saulteau First Nation's history and
circumstances, people would also have to begin
working out internal cultural relationships and
practices, and guiding legal principles. Examining
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the Saulteaux people's move into Dunneza lands in
1911 could provide some critical insights. What
was required according to Saulteaux law and
governing practices, and how were these terms met?
Similarly, what was required according to Dunneza
law and governing practices, and how were these
terms met?
Again, while it is unlikely that Saulteau
First Nation would ever be recognized as self-
determining, this is a way for the community to
engage in a self-determination political project
beyond the struggles and confines of the Indian Act
structures and the destructive boundaries created by
the membership laws (Nedelsky 1990, 17). This is
also a way for Saulteau First Nation to deliberately
and reflexively build social cohesion and expand
the capacity of its citizenry by promoting concerns
about social stability, political unity, and civil peace
(Borrows 2003, 229-30). The work of governing
must necessarily include thinking about how to
ensure enough distance between people to enable
consideration of the public good and accountability
beyond any immediate matters in dispute (Saul
1995, 173). For small communities, this necessarily
means thinking on a nation basis rather than on a
village or band basis.
Individual Self-Determination
Nedelsky's reconceptualization of
autonomy and individual self-determination is
directly applicable to Saulteau First Nation. At root,
Nedelsky redefined autonomy with a social
component that reflected the individual's
surrounding relationships, and as a capacity that
existed inside our social relationships in conjunction
with an internal sense of autonomy. So first of all,
members of Saulteau First Nation, including
women, have to feel autonomous, which
engagement in larger self-determining projects can
foster. And second, the relationships that foster
relational autonomy in terms of freedom and
support to create one's own life must be identified
and recognized as self-determining.
For Saulteau First Nation, what is
particularly important about this approach is to
consider cultural values and institutions, as well as
what the damages caused by colonization are. Since
change has occurred and there was no golden age
anyway, the next question to consider is how to
compensate for the damages caused by recent
history. Again, this work is ongoing and there is no
arrival. Instead, it enables people, and this must
deliberately include women, to engage on a
personal and individual level with a larger self-
determination project. As Nedelsky predicted, her
reconceptualization of individual self-determination
is infinitely compatible with collective self-
determination when it is imagined at the community
level (1989, 12). (This is in contrast to Möllers, who
writes (2003, 13), "Individual autonomy and
collective autonomy have a complicated
relationship...There is no general rule to solve this
conflict [between individual liberty and the liberty
of others]. Political theory may have to choose
between liberal or communitarian concepts of
society.")
N edelsky makes the cautionary
observation that participation is extremely time-
consuming, and once people think that their
participation has been effective, their level of
participation may decrease (1998, 18). The tension
is that protecting individual and collective self-
determination ultimately depends on ongoing
participation, but this is difficult to maintain over
the long term (1998, 20).
CONCLUSION
Accord ing  to  T ully, alternative
conceptions of indigenous nations are relational
(internally and externally), whereby "'freedom' is
not the property of an independent subject
(individuals, peoples, nations) outside of
relationships of mutual dependency, but a quality of
mutually constitutive dialogical relationships of
interdependency among partners" (2005, 50-51). As
with other aboriginal communities in Canada,
Saulteau First Nation has its share of social
problems (for example, addictions, poor health, and
unemployment) created by the soul-crushing
powerlessness of colonialism and conflict as
demonstrated by the internal litigation in recent
years. Any future self-determination project must be
built on the conflicted reality of people's
experiences - in relationships, families, and
communities. 
Overall, I think that intentionally
identifying a Saulteaux-Cree-Dunneza relational
autonomy with the goal of encouraging individual
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self-determination that corresponds with a
developed, collective conception of self-
determination is a huge political step to undertake.
I am very optimistic about the possibilities, but I am
under no illusions about the enormous work that
such a development would entail. Nor am I under
any misconceptions about the willingness of
aboriginal communities, including my own, to
undertake this very difficult work.
ENDNOTES
1. In this paper, I distinguish self-determination from the closely related concept of self-government. "Self-determination" is the right
of an aboriginal nation to choose how it will be governed. In other words, "Self-determination refers to the collective power of choice;
self-government is one possible result of that choice" (Canada 1996, 175).
2. The resistance in South Africa continues despite that fact that apartheid there was successfully countered with self-determination
arguments (M uehlebach 2003, 248).
3. The Royal Commission noted that the current Indian Act band structure is an obstacle to its nation-based approach: "[O]ne of the
effects of the band orientation of the Indian Act has been to foster loyalties at the level of the local community, at the expense of broader
national affinities arising from a com mon language, culture, spirituality and historical experience" (1996, 235).
4. The Royal Commission acknowledged that aboriginal nations have been fragmented and dispersed under the impact of colonialism.
Given this, the Commission recognized that aboriginal nations needed an opportunity to deal with the impairment of internal political
ties and common identity in order to reconstitute themselves as m odern political units (1996, 178).
5. At issue was whether the territory of Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) belonged to no one (terra nullius) at the time
of its colonization by Spain. In its advisory opinion, the Court unanimously held that the Western Sahara was not terra nullius.
6. The International Institute for Self-Determination estimates that there are eighty-four current conflicts around the globe that centre
around issues of self-determination.
7. According to Ian Brownlie, the concept of individual self-determination can be traced back to the French revolution (1970, 3).
8. Saulteau First Nation initiated a legal action challenging the O il and Gas Com m ission's approval of an application to drill an
exploration well in an area that is, as yet, pristine and important for its hunting and trapping values to band members. The band is arguing
that the cumulative impacts of the well drilling are an infringement to its treaty rights because while the well only has a twenty per cent
chance of productivity, drilling means building roads, bridges, and industrial infrastructure. The Oil and Gas Commission is arguing,
among other things, that impacts of exploration are negligible and do not have to be considered unless the well is productive. The lower
court ruling against Saulteau First Nation  has been appealed. At the time of writing, the appeal decision had not yet been handed down
(Apsassin v. B.C. Oil and Gas).
9. This adhesion was negotiated as a treaty entitlement agreement with the federal and provincial governments. There is considerable
hostility between Saulteau First Nation and the M cLeod Lake Band, largely stemming from very different approaches to economic
development on treaty lands. M any Saulteau First Nation members consider themselves to be traditionalists and are opposed to major
industrial development. See the McLeod Lake Indian Band Treaty No. 8 Adhesion and Settlement Agreement Act.
10. There are two drafts with proposed amendments: (1) Saulteau First Nations Interim Election Procedures (4 April 2002), and (2)
Saulteau First Nations Election Procedures: Post Election Amendments to the April 4, 2002 Version. Amendments may be initiated by
a minimum  of fifty band members or by chief and council. In either case, a process is set out in the proposed amendm ents for required
time frames, notice periods, and sixty per cent approval rate by band members eligible to vote.
11. This latter case was limited to dealing with a request by the plaintiffs for a summary judgment that subsequently was denied. Given
this, it would appear that the original cause of action is still outstanding since it was not dealt with in these proceedings. The legal issues
in this cause of action were to determine (1) whether the band's custom law permitted the removal of chief from office and if so, by what
procedure; and (2) whether a claim of declarative and injunctive relief by the former elected chief, Robin Pacquette, was supportable.
However, Blais J. stated that Robin Pacquette failed to demonstrate that he was entitled to file an action on behalf of Saulteau First
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Nation, and he recommended resolving the question as to whether the band should be a plaintiff or a defendant through a case-
management process. The Band Government Law in place at the time of Pacquette's trial did have a provision to challenge the
selection/election of the chief, but it did not have a provision for the removal of the chief from office.
12. The Saulteau Indian Nation Citizenship Act includes provisions for appeals and am endm ent processes. To hear appeals, a five-
member citizenship committee will be established with two elders (minimum 55 years old), one representative for chief and council,
and two band m embers.
13. For example, in s. 6, the enrolment officer is required to consider ("shall") the list of criteria, but there is no guidance as to how to
actually decide m em bership based on the criteria. Does an applicant's ability to speak only a little Cree or Saulteaux qualify? M ore
importantly, the way the section currently reads, even if the applicant is fluent in either language as well as knowledgeable about
Saulteaux customs, traditions, and "way of life," there is no requirement that the enrolment officer accept him or her as a member. It is
also unclear whether the applicant must meet all three criteria or just one.
14. Different histories and cultures have produced different ways for large groups of people to define themselves and relate to others,
and to non-human life forms, space, and land. Hence, western and aboriginal constructs of nationhood are profoundly different, and
therefore care must be taken not to simply apply a western definition. One cultural difference is in divergent cosmologies. For instance,
many aboriginal nations make no fundam ental distinction between the history of humans and the history of the world, and they fuse
human power with the power of the land. Another critical cultural difference is in the structuring of social and political regimes (e.g.,
hierarchical vs. non-hierarchical and decentralized vs. centralized). In order to emphasize the difference in constructs of nationhood,
som e authors use the term "peoples" rather than "nations" when referring to groups of aboriginal people. 
15. I use the term "legal order" in this paper to describe legal rules and procedures that are undifferentiated from social life and from
political and religious institutions. Legal systems, on the other hand, may be described as distinct, integrated bodies of law, consciously
systematized by professionals with specialized institutions, legislation, and the "science of laws"( see Berman 1983, 49-50.).
16. According to John Borrows, "The doctrine of discovery has been - and still is - rigorously advanced by various authors, jurists, legal
scholars, nation states and domestic courts as the foundation upon which English, Canadian or American sovereignty in North America
is based. The basic premise is that the first state to 'discover' an uninhabited region with no other claims to it automatically acquires
territorial sovereignty. Originally the doctrine was limited to terra nullius - literally, a barren and deserted area .. The concept of terra
nullius was expanded later, without justification, to include any area devoid of 'civilized' society. In order to reflect colonial desires, the
New World was said by som e courts to fall within this expanded definition" (1998, 6).
17. According to Carole Goldberg, "membership" is used instead of "citizenship" for aboriginal people in the United States because the
Bureau of Indian Affairs does not perceive aboriginal people as self-determ ining, but as equated with various social and non-profit
groups (2002, 437).
18. M cCue also considers Anaya's internal/external self-determination model, but rejects it as inappropriate to the Ned'u'ten. According
to Anaya, "[t]he internal/external dichotomy views self-determination as having two discrete dom ains: one having to do with matters
entirely internal to a people (such as rights of political participation) and the other having to do exclusively with a people's status or
dealings vis-à-vis other peoples (such as freedom from alien rule). The internal/external dichotomy effectively is premised on the
conception, rejected earlier, of a limited universe of 'peoples' comprising mutually exclusive spheres of com munity (i.e., states)" (81).
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Living Language
She tells us the Ojibwe word for blueberry pie
is the recipe to make:
miiniibashkimiinasigunbatagiingwesijiiganbiitooingwesijiiganibakwezhigan
as we pick the delicate fruit from each calyx 
indigo bulb hanging from a perfect five-pointed star
a gift to relieve children's hunger
selecting each one, each star-berry staining our fingers purple-red
we can't help but pop some in our mouths.
She had said the juice could cure a cough 
and the leaves could be tea — would be good for our blood.
In the summers they'd dry them and store for long winters.
We trod through marshy ground searching for the next lowbush
can taste the pie already, baking slowly in her stove
can see her careful thumbs creating the wave that edges the crust
sliding the fork through the top in four directions
holes for breath
as we punch ours out now — blueberry hunting.
We are this language of progression, this recipe
renewed each time our pails are filled and
our fingers drip hard blood in gratitude at the end of days.
Molly McGlennen
